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Section 2.I. 
The Beginning: from the Permanent Court 
of International Justice to the ICJ Advisory 
Opinions of the Fifties 
The Modernity of the 1927 PCIJ Advisory Opinion on the 
]urisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube 
between Galatz and Brai/a 
Alina Miron, 
Researcher at the University Paris-Ouest, Nanterre- La Défense 
1. Introduction 
The subject-matter of my intervertion is not necessarily a 
burning issue: it concems an almost centennial advisory opinion 
of the PCIJ, relating to the powers of the late European Commission 
of the Danube, on a small portion of the River between Galatz 
and Braila'. Still, it is an interesting topic, on more than one 
account. That was Romania's first case before The Hague Court. 
As such, it is a good pretext to dive into history. As any self-
respecting intemationalist, 1 started with the little history, that of 
international law in Romania. The 1927 Advisory Opinion coincided 
with a period of great interest for international law among 
Romanian Academies. Vespasian Pella had published his visionary 
studies in international criminallaw, a couple of years before the 
PCIJ was seized.2 The Advisory Opinion itself increased the taste 
1 PCIJ, Advisory Opinion, 8 December 1927, Jurisdiction of the European Com-
mission of the Danube, Series B, No. 14 (hereafter 1927 Advisory Opinion). 
2 La criminalité collective des États et le droit pénal de l'avenir, Bucarest: Impri-
merie de l'État, 1925. See also G. Sbâma (ed.), Vespasian V. Pella- în slujba 
~tiinfei dreptului ~i a cauzei piicii, Ploief?ti: Ed. Karta-Graphic, 2011, 769 p. 
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for the discipline: sorne years afterwards, the Romanian Deputy-
Judge Dumitru Negulescu delivered at The Hague Academy a 
very interesting course, about the system of advisory opinions 
before the PCIJ.J The .course was published in 1936, but many of 
its conclusions are still valid today. At the same period, Paul 
Negulescu gave a forward thinking course on international 
administrative law,4 which inspired the new school of global 
administrative law.s Mention must be also made of Mircea Djuvara, 
who, around the same period, delivered a course of theory of law, 
entitled Le fondement de l'ordre juridique positif en droit international. 6 
I hope the 2009 Judgment will initiate a trend similar to the one 
created by the 1927 Advisory Opinion (and this conference augurs 
weil for). 
The tapie of the 1927 Advisory Opinion is also a good pretext 
to dive into the big history, of Europe in general and of Romania 
in particular. The Advisory Opinion is first a reflection of the 
European history during the 19th and 2oth century- the exorbitant 
powers of the European Commission of the Danube are mere! y a 
mirror the succession of empires, of the rivalry between the Orient 
and the Occident, it has a flavour of Mittleuropa. The Treaty of 
Paris (1856) setting up the 1st Commission, internationalized the 
Danube. The Treaty was a direct consequence of the defeat of the 
Russian Empire during the Crimean War, by an alliance of the 
rench Empire, the Sublime Gate, Great Britain and Sardinia. 
ubsequently to the 1856 Treaty, severa! others were concluded, 
D. Negulescu, L'évolution de la procédure des avis consultatifs de la Cour per-
anente de justice internationale, 57 RCADI (1936), pp. 1-96. 
. Negulescu, Principes du droit international administratif, 51 RCADI (1935), 
'P· 579-691. 
. Kingsbury et all., "The Emergence of Global Administrative Law", Law 
nd Contemporary Problems, vol. 68 (2005), passim. 
. Djuvara, Le fondement de l'ordre juridique positif en droit international, 64 
CADI (1939), pp. 479-625. 
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adapting the status of the River to the balance of powers in Europe 
and to the necessity to ensure freedom of navigation.? As an 
observer noted, "[b ]y its physical presence at the mou th of the 
Danube the Commission was a symbol and sentine! of the political 
interest of the west in preserving south-eastern Europe and Turkey 
from Russian domination."8 The exorbitant, quasi-sovereign powers 
of the Danube Commission (as weil as those of the other river 
commissions in Europe) can only be apprehended within this 
larger historie context. 
It must also be recalled that, at the time of the Advisory Opinion, 
Romania was a young State: the Opinion was given less than a 
decade after "the Great Union" of 1918, when Transylvania was 
annexed to Romania, and fifty years after Romania's independence 
from the Ottoman Empire. Romania's position during the 1927 
proceedings fully reflects its external politics during the interbellum 
period, the gist of which was a consolidation of territorial 
sovereignty, but also integration into "the concert of nations". The 
proceedings bear witness of Romania's attachment to the League 
of Nations: although it had not accepted the Court's jurisdiction 
to settle the dispute by contentious proceedings, Romania agreed 
the matter be submitted for an advisory opinion. As Charles de 
Visscher pointed out: "l'avis de la Cour( ... ) a exactement rendu aux 
Gouvernements intéressés le service qu'ils en attendaient: en les fixant 
sur leurs situations juridiques respectives, il a facilité les négociations 
ultérieures."9 Romania's normative stance in that particular case, 
7 On the succession of treaties relating to the Status of the Danube River, see 
S. McCaffrey, European Commission of the Danube, Jurisdiction of the (Adviso-
ry Opinion), in R. Wolfrum et all. (eds.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public In-
ternational Law, available at: http://www.mpepil.com/, §§ 2-4 . 
B J. Campbell, "Diplomacy on the Danube"l(1949), available at: http://www. 
foreignaffairs.com/articles/70728/john-c-campbell/diplomacy-on-the-danube . 
9 Ch. de Visscher, Les avis consultatifs de la Cour permanente de Justice interna-
tionale, 26 RCADI (1929), pp. 41-42. 
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and the Court's answer about the extent of the obligations 
incumbent upon it, can only be understood by resituating the 
judicial reasoning in that case within the normative context of the 
19th century. Since the Court had to interpret and apply treaties 
signed during the 19th century, the Advisory Opinion necessarily 
bears the mark of this era, where the principle of sovereign equality 
of States had but little place in internationallaw.1o 
Finally, the 1927 Advisory Opinion is above ali an excellent 
pretext to review the development of the international organizations, 
and of the legal principles goveming their action and their relations 
with States. 
II. Modalities of Engagement in a System of 
Inequality of States 
"Sovereign equality is a fundamental axiomatic premise of the 
international legal order."n Such statements are in fact founded 
upon a fundamental achievement of the 2oth century, not upon a 
natural truth, inherent to the international legal system from its 
incipit. One may too quickly overlook the fact there was an 
evolution towards "formai equality".u The case-law of the 
Permanent Court reflects sorne of its episodes. 
As Judge Anzilotti underlined in his Individual Opinion in the 
Customs Regime between Germany and Austria case: 
"Independence as thus understood is really no more than 
the normal condition of States according to international 
On the origin and the scope of the princip le of sovereign equality, see ]. 
Crawford, "Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law. Gen-
eral Course on Public International Law", RCADI (2013), forthcoming, §§ 460-472. 1 
J. Kokott, "States, Sovereign equality", in MPEPIL, op. cit. note 70. 
J. Crawford, op. cit. note 73, §§ 464-468. 
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law; it may also be described as sovereignty (suprema 
potestas), or extemal sovereignty, by which is meant that 
the State has over it no other authority than that of 
international law. The conception of independence, 
regarded as the normal characteristic of States as subjects 
of international law, cannot be better defined than by 
comparing it which the exceptional and, to sorne extent, 
abnormal class of States known as 'dependent States'. 
These are States subject to the authority of one or more 
other States. The idea of dependence therefore necessarily 
implies a relation between a superior State (suzerain, 
protector, etc.) and an inferior or subject State (vassal, 
protégé, etc.); the relation between the State which can 
legally impose its will and the State which is legally 
compelled to submit to that will. Where there is no such 
relation of superiority and subordination, it is impossible 
to speak of dependence within the meaning of 
intemationallaw."13 
Therefore, because of the "abnormal class of States known as 
'dependent States"', the international system of the 19th and the 
fust half of the 2oth century was not one of foqnal equality of States. 
When the regime for internationalization of the Danube was 
established (in 1856), Remania was such a "dependent State". The 
first problematic issue in the 1927 Advisory Opinion was to 
determine whether and how Remania could be held bound by 
the regime established by the Great Powers. 
The Advisory Opinion reflects another peculiarity of the law-
making process during the 19th century: at that time, participation 
in treaty-making was considered a privilege. It was not sufficient 
for an (independent) State to have a legitimate interest in the 
13 PCIJ, Advisory Opinion, 5 September 1931, Customs Regime between Germa-
ny and Austria, Series A!B, No. 41, Individual Opinion fudge D. Anzilotti, p. 57· 
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subject-matter of the treaty for its participation to be granted. It 
also had to be co-opted by the other powers. 
This reasoning shows through in the Commission of the Danube 
Advisory Opinion, where the Court underlined, in respect to the 
Ottoman Empire: 
"It was not until1856 that definite provision was made 
for the intemationalization of the Danube. Turkey, under 
whose dominion the mouths of the lower part of the 
Stream lay, was not a party to the arrangements of Vienna, 
and was not then admitted to the concert of the Powers. But 
by the Treaty of Peace between Austria, France, Great 
Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, signed at 
Paris on March 30th, 1856, bringing to a close the Crimean 
War, Turkey was (Article 7) admitted 'to participate in the 
advantages of the pub1ic law and concert of Europe', and the 
contracting Powers, while engaging each to respect the 
independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire, agreed to guarantee in common the strict 
observance of that engagement. Coïncident! y with this 
elevation of the position of Turkey in Europe, Article 15 of 
the Treaty expressly declared that the Vienna princip les 
relating to the intemationalization of rivers should in 
future be applied to the Danube and its mouths, that 
this provision should henceforth form 'a part of the 
Public Law of Europe', and that the High Contracting 
Parties took it 'under their guarantee'."'4 
Indeed the Treaty of Paris brought the regime for the Danube 
in alignment with that of the Rhine, as the latter had been 
established at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, by the Final Act 
of the Congress of Vienna ( 1815). Since the Ottoman Empire had 
1927 Advisory Opinion, p. 40 (emphasis added). 
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not participated in the Congress of Vienna, the Final Act was of 
course not binding upon it as such. But the "princip les of Vienna", 
namely the legal rules relating to the internationalization of rivers 
referring embodied in the Final Act, became opposable to Turkey 
through Article 15 of the Treaty of Paris, who referred to and thus 
incorporated them in the conventional regime applicable to the 
Danube. 
After its independence, Romania became the sovereign on the 
territory of which the regime of internationalization of the Danube 
was applicable. It was not contested that the Ottoman Empire had 
been a Party to the Treaty of Paris and the subsequent treaties 
adjusting the regime on the Danube. It was also not contested that 
Romania had substituted itself to the Ottoman Empire as far as 
the obligations relating to the Danube were concerned. Still, the 
Court did not hold that Romania was bound through succession 
to treaties orto territorial regimes. The reason is simple: the modem 
legal concepts relating to State succession only emerged after the 
great wave of decolonization in the 196o's.'s At the end of the 19th 
century and the beginning of the 2oth, voluntarism was the 
predominant doctrine in international law, which "denied the 
possibility of succession to pre-existing rights and obligations".'6 
Accordingly, the only way a State could be held to be bound by 
treaty obligations was through its consent. 
Now, Romania was obviously not a party to the 1856 Treaty of 
Paris establishing the Commission- this was not an open treaty, 
in the first hall of the 19th century the possibility for States to ratify 
treaties after their adoption was not envisaged. Moreover, even 
1s See A. Zimmermann, State Succession, in MPEPIL op. cit. note 70, § 3· On 
the difference between the conceptualization of State succession during the 
19th and 20th century, seeS. Rosenne, An International Law Miscellany, Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1993, pp. 294-295. 
16 M. Craven, The Decolonization of International Law: State Succession and the 
Law ofTreaties, Oxford U.P., 2010, p. 90. 
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if Romania had been ful~y independent since 1878, it was not 
admitted to participate to the Berlin and London conferences of 
1878-1883, other than as ~ observer. Still, these conferences were 
aimed at extending the powers of the Commission between Galatz 
and Braila. 
On the other hand, Romania had ratified the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles and the Definitive Statute of the Danube of 1921. And 
both treaties recognized that the Commission would exercise the 
same competences as before WWI. Indeed, Article 41 of the 
Definitive Statute "expressly provide(d) that all treaties, 
conventions, acts and agreements relative to international 
waterways generally, and particularly to the Danube and its mouths, 
which were in force when the Statu te was signed, are maintained 
in all their stipulations not abrogated or modified by the Statu te 
itself." Because of this let's cali it "referral clause",'7 the Court held 
that "the Definitive Statute was not complete in itself".'8 Prior 
obligations were thus incorporated into it and became opposable 
to Romania. The Court could thus hold that Romania's ratification 
of the Statu te was worth consent to these prior obligations. 
Therefore, like in the case of Turkey, treaty-clauses providing 
referral to previous conventions ensured that the norms enshrined 
in these prior conventions become applicable to States which had 
not ratified them. By relying on the mechanism of the referral 
clauses, the Court could formally identify the consent at the basis 
of a State's obligation. Its consent did not apply to the prior treaty 
as such, but to the obligations contained therein'9. Still, the 
17 On "referral clauses", see M. Forteau, "Les renvois inter-conventionnels", 
49 Annuaire français de droit international (2003), pp. 71-104. 
1s 1927 Advisory Opinion, p. 23. 
19 The present Court was also confronted to the effect of referral clauses, for 
instance in the Pulp Mills case, in which the Status of the Uruguay River 
contained a reference to other "applicable international agreements and ( ... ) 
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distinction is tenuous. Indeed, in arder to determine the extent of 
Romania's obligations, the Court had to interpret and apply various 
provisions of the Treaty of Paris, of the 1866 Protocole, of the 1878 
Treaty of Berlin and the 1883 Treaty of London- to which Romania 
was not a party20 - and also the 1881 Additional Act and the 1919 
treaty of Versailles, which Romania had signed, together with 
various regulations of the Danube Commission." The normative 
regime was more than complex, and the powers of the Danube 
Commission under this regime, overwl;lelming, as will further be 
seen. 1 
III. An International Institution Precursory of the 
Organizations of Integration 
The institutional framework established by this network of 
treaties was complex: it comprised in fact two commissions, with 
qui te distinct powers: on the Lower or maritime Danube (between 
the River mouth and Braila), the European Commission whose 
membership was reduced to Great Britain, France, Italy, and 
Romania; on the upper or "fluvial Danube" (between Ulm and 
Braila), an International Commission, whose membership included 
all riparians as well as the non-riparians on the European 
Commission., The 1927 Advisory Opinion is only concemed with 
the European Commission. This explains why Parties to the 
to the guidelines and recommendations of international technical bodies" 
(ICJ, Judgment, 20 April 2010, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argen tina v. 
Uruguay),§ 6). For various reasons, in this case, the referral clause was 
nonetheless of a lesser effect; the ICJ considered it could not incorpora te 
"the obligations of the parties under [these] international agreements and 
other norms envisaged within the ambit of the 1975 Statute" (ibid., § 62). 
2o 1927 Advisory Opinion, p. 11. 
21 See 1927 Advisory Opinion, pp. 41-42. 
22 See A. F. Zeilinger, "Danube River", in MPEPIL op. cit. note 70, § 6. 
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Advisory Opinion were Romania, on the one side, France, Great 
Britain and Italy on the other.23 
The Commission was endowed with powers to regulate 
navigation over the River, under ali its aspects. The purpose of 
this transfer was comprehensive: to ensure "freedom of navigation 
for ali flags under a uniform law uniformly administered"."'~ In 
addition to carrying out technical works, it established taxes; it 
maintained its own vessels, its own police force and its own courts. 
Its regulations were directly applicable within the riparian States 
orto ali private pers'?ns using the River. It even had the competence 
to institute criminal sanctions for those violating its regulations. 
These are realiy extraordinary powers. Anton Florian Zeilinger 
considered that: "[i]n hindsight it can be attested that it was one 
of the first international organizations with international legal 
personality, equipped with supranational powers ( ... ) comparable 
to those enjoyed today by the European (Economie) Community".2 5 
Moreover, the European Commission enjoyed great autonomy 
vis-à-vis its Members. Its officiais were appointed autonomously 
and enjoyed quasi-diplomatie immunities. It is for good reasons 
that it was metaphoricaliy calied "un État fluvial". 26 
On substance, Romania's position was defence of its territorial 
sovereignty. This meant, in that case, the will to suppress or 
alieviate the territorial servitudes it had inherited as a "successor" 
23 The term "Parties" may seem inadequate for an advisory opinion; howev-
er, as D. Negulescu explained, the mechanism of advisory opinions before 
the Permanent Court was also used to resolve international disputes be-
tween States. He called this type of advisory opinions an "arbitrage consul-
tative" (ap. cit. note 66, pp. 87-88). 
24 1927 Advisory Opinion, Observations by Judge Moore, p. 82. 
25 A. F. Zeilinger, ap. cit. note 88, § 5· 
26 J. Spiropoulos, "L'individu et le droit international", 30 RCADI (1929), pp. 
232-233 and F. von Holtzendorff cited by J. Kunz, "Privileges and immuni-
ties of international organizations", AJIL (1947), p. 848. 
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State. Thus, Romania's position in relation to the subject-matter 
submitted to the Court was to agree that the Commission had the 
technical powers to engage into works for maintaining the 
navigability of the River, and to dispute that it had any "normative 
powers", as Romania calied them, namely powers to establish 
taxes or powers of police and jurisdiction to enforce its decisions. 
The essence of the dispute before the Court thus concerned the 
powers of the Commission and their layout with the sovereign 
powers of the State. 
Iv. The Modernity of the Legal Princip les 
Underlying the 1927 Advisory Opinion 
The Court's decision was not a mere casuist assessment of the 
powers of a particular international institution; on the contrary, 
the Court went beyond that and established the bases of the law 
of international organizations (or institutionallaw, as it is now 
calied). Its reasoning in this respect is striking of modernity. The 
1927 Advisory Opinion laid the bases of essential principles of 
institutionallaw, such as the princip le of enumerated powers and 
the principle of implied powers; it equaliy stressed the role of 
institutional practice for the interpretation of the constituent 
instrument. ' 
a) The princip le of enumerated powers (or princip le of speciality) 
First, the principle of enumerated powers: an international 
organization has only the powers vested in it by the constituent 
treaty (or treaties). This is one of the core-stone principles of 
international institutionallaw, and the Permanent Court's reasoning 
in this Advisory Opinion was relied upon frequently in the 
subsequent case-law. For instance, in the Advisory Opinion 
concerning the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in 
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Armed Conflict (WHO), the ICJ referred to the 1927 Advisory 
Opinion as to an authority and recalled the tenure of the principle 
of speciality in terms similar of those used by the Permanent 
Court: 
"The Court need hardly point out that international 
organizations are subjects of international law which do 
not, unlike States, possess a general competence. 
International organizations are governed by the 
"principle of speciality", that is to say, they are invested 
by the States which crea te them with powers, the limits 
of which are a function of the common interests whose 
promotion those States entrust to them."2 7 
Indeed, the Permanent Court stressed that the Danube 
Commission, despite its exorbitant powers, was "not an 
organization possessing exclusive territorial sovereignty".28 It 
drew upon the difference of nature between aState and an 
international organization to underline the inequality in law 
between them: 
"As the European Commission is not a State, but an 
international institution with a special purpose, it only 
has the functions bestowed upon it by the Definitive 
Statu te with a view to the fulfilment of that purpose."29 
The most obvious consequence of this assessment is that the 
State enjoys the plenitude of powers over a territory, while the 
international organizations only have the powers enumerated by 
the treaties: 
27 See ICJ, Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons 
in Armed Conjlict, [ 1996] ICJ Rep, p. 66, § 25 quoting the 1927 Advisory Opin-
ion. 
28 1927 Advisory Opinion, p. 63. 
29 Ibid., p. 64. 
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The question of a possible concurrence between the powers of 
the State and those of the international organizations was further 
discussed. The idea was triggered by the far-fetched 
"internationalization"Jo of the River, at least in the maritime part, 
falling under the competence of the European Commission. In a 
dense and far-reaching statement, the Court considered that, if 
ever concurrence was to arise, it could only be resolved by ensuring 
that bath entities can fulfil their missions: 
''When in one and the same area there are two independent 
authorities, the only way in which it is possible to 
differentia te between their respective jurisdictions is by 
defining the functions allotted to them."31 
Indeed, the concept of" function" lies at the basis of international 
institutionallaw; it even accounts for the nature of the organisations. 
Of course, one may consider that bath the State and the 
international organization are legal creatures; but the former is a 
complete subject, with a general competence, impersonating 
peoples and territories, whereas the international organizations 
are merely legal institutions created by those States, for a specifie 
purpose. Their raison d'être is not inherent, but rests within the 
purpose attributed to them. Indeed international organizations 
tend to merge with the functions attributed to them.J> 
30 The concept is defined by R. Wolfrum and J. Pichon as convering "a situa-
tion where a territory, a river, or a canal within the terri tory of one State was 
brought under the protection, control, or management of another State or 
of several States.( ... ) One feature of this concept is that the territorial sov-
ereignty of a specifie State is limited in favour of another State, a larger 
group of States, or the community of States as a whole." ("Internationali-
zation" in MPEPIL op.cit. note 70, § 1. See also ibid.,§ 18). 
31 1927 Advisory Opinion, p. 64. 
32 V. aussi M. Virally, << La notion de fonction dans le théorie de l'organiation 
internationale >>, in Mélanges offerts à Charles Rousseau, Paris, Pedone, 1974, 
pp. 277-300. 
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b) The International Legal Personality of International Organizations 
To an internationallawyer's mind, this reasoning is very 
familiar: it brings to mind the ICJ's celebrissime dictum in the 
Reparation for Injuries case, where the Court held that the United 
Nations enjoyed legal personality, which "is not the same thing 
as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal 
personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State" .J3 
In light of the Permanent Court's reasoning in 1927, this seems 
already less revolutionary.34 What is surprising is that in 1945 an 
issue arase about the legal personality of an international 
organization, a question taken for granted in 1927. But the two 
opinions are complementary too: it is by reading them together 
that we conclude that the personality of an international 
organization is functional. 
c) The Principle of Implied Powers 
The 1927 Advisory Opinion also bears the first hint to the 
principle of implied powers. The Court stressed that the Danube 
Commission "has power to exercise [its] functions to their full 
extent."Js Even if sorne means of action are not expressly provided 
for in the constituent treaty, the Organization is held to enjoy them, 
as long as that action is nec~ssary to fulfi.1 its purpose. The posterity 
of this principle36 and its great influence on the development of 
institutionallaw need hardly to be recalled. 
33 ICJ, Advisory Opinion, 11 April1949, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in 
the Service of the United Nations, Reports 1949, p. 179 and Advisory Opin-
ion, 20 July 1962, Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Reports 1962, p. 159· 
34 See also C.F. Amerasinghe, Princip les of the Institutional Law of Inter-
national Organizations, CUP Cambridge, 2005, p. 77· See also S. Mc Caffrey, 
op. cit., para. 16. 
35 1927 Advisory Opinion, p. 64. 
36 See ICJ, Reparation for Injuries, op. cit. note 99, p. 18o. 
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d) The Role of Institutional Practice 
The last aspect of legacy of the 1927 Advisory Opinion concerns 
the role of institutional practice for the interpretation of a 
constituent treaty. The extension of the powers of the Danube 
Commission was a contentious issue between Remania and the 
ether members of the Commission because it resulted not from 
previous treaties, but from institutional practice. At the end of the 
19th century, the Commission had gradually elaborated regulations 
and took measures to enforce them for the portion of the River 
between Braila and Galatz. Before the Court, Remania challenged 
the legality of these regulations. However, the Advisory Opinion 
recalled that: 
"In this usage the Roumanian delegate tacitly but formally 
acquiesced, in the sense that a moda vivendi was observed 
on bath sides according to which the sphere of action of 
the Commission in fact extended in all respects as far as 
above Braila."37 
The Court treated the question as a matter of opposability of 
international obligations of Remania and not of legality or validity 
of institutionallaw. In this perspective, the Court acknowledged 
that tacit acquiescence in institutional practice is source of powers 
for the international organizations, and of correlative obligations 
for their member States. 
This is another far-reaching finding. For instance, the ICJ was 
again confronted to the effect of institutional practice in the 
Whaling case38• The International Whaling Commission has 
adopted, over the years, a series of resolutions concerning 
37 1927 Advisory Opinion, p. 17. 
38 ICJ, Judgment of 31 March 2014, Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. 
Japan: New Zealand intervening). 
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scientific whaling. Japan contested their legality, on grounds 
that, according to the 1946 Whaling Convention, this form of 
whaling could not be regulated by the Commission. Australia 
and New Zealand, on the other side, argued that institutional 
practice was an informai way for developing the powers of the 
Commission; insofar it remained in line with its mission under 
the Convention. In its Judgment of 31 March 2014, the Court 
avoided the thorny quesbon of the validity of institutional acts. 
It however addressed the interaction between institutional 
practice and evolving interpretation of institutional treaties. In 
line with the 1927 Advisory Opinion, the Court stressed that 
recommendations, which obviously lack binding force per se, 
cannot become opposable to Member States via the process of 
interpretation of the constitutive act, a fortiori if the said States 
expressed their opposition to these resolutions: 
"[M]any IWC resolutions were adopted without the 
support of ali States parties to the Convention and, in 
particular, without the concurrence of ]a pan. Thus, such 
instruments cannot be regarded as subsequent agreement 
to an interpretation of Article VIII, nor as subsequent 
practice establishing an agreement of the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty within the 
meaning of subparagraphs (a) and (b), respectively, of 
paragraph (3) of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties."J9 
Thus, as a matter of interpretation of constitutive acts of 
international organizations, the Court thus conditioned the 
relevance of the non-binding resolutions to their unanimous or 
consensual adoption: 
Ibid., para. 83. 
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"These recommendations, which take the form of 
resolutions, are not binding. However, when they are 
adopted by consensus or by a un~ous vote, they may 
be relevant for the interpretatioJ of the Convention or 
its Schedule.""" 
Today, the principles of enumerated powers, implied powers 
or development of powers through institutional interpretation 
are so consolidated that they resemble to mere technical maxims 
of international institutionallaw. But, as the 1927 Advisory Opinion 
shows, they were first a way of formulating and resolving the 
tension between State sovereignty and decisions taken by 
international organizations, sometimes against the will of the State. 
In the 1927 Advisory Opinion, the Court's response consisted in 
a constant reference to Romania's consent: consent to the existence 
of the Commission, consent to its mission, and tacit consent to its 
powers. Thus, for the Permanent Court, participation in 
international organizations endowed with powers to create new 
legal obligations was simply another form of international 
commitment, which, far from being an "abandonment of( ... ) 
sovereignty ( ... )", were an attribute of it- to quote the judgment 
in the Wimbledon caseY 
The Court had already had the occasion to apply the Wimbledon 
rationale to a treaty creating an international organization in the 
1922 Advisory Opinion concerning the Competence of the lLO. In 
that case, it was argued that extensive interpretation of a constituent 
treaty could amount to an infringement of the States' sovereignty. 
The Court held there that sovereignty was not in peril as long as 
the competence of the organization was expressly or implicitly 
foreseen by the constituent treaty: 
40 Ibid., para. 46. 
41 PCIJ, Judgment, 17 August 1923, S.S. Wimbledon, Series A, No. 1, p. 25. 
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"It was much urged in argument that the establishment 
of the International Labour Organisation involved an 
abandonment of rights derived from national sovereignty, 
and that the competence of the Organisation therefore 
should not be extended by interpretation. There may be 
sorne force in this argument, but the question in every 
case must resolve itself into what the terms of the Treaty 
actually mean, and it is from this point of view that the 
Court proposes to examine the question."-12 
V. River Commissions: Search for New Forms of 
International Cooperation 
The princip le of speciality and the princip le of implied powers 
were thus meant to strike the right balance between sovereignty 
and enhanced international cooperation through international 
organization. lt seems however that this balance was precarious: 
to be sure, the principles survived, but not the model of 
international organization formed by the river Commissions 
themselves. lndeed, no organization exists today having powers 
as extended as those of the river commissions during the 19th and 
the beginning of the 2oth century. 
The present Danube Commission is formed by Ri parian States; 
and it took a while until they were all admitted. lts mission was 
reduced to the supervision of technical works over the River; it is 
not vested with any power to take binding decisions. Its means -
normative, but also budgetary- are just like its missions: greatly 
lowered.43 This is certainly due to the context of the adoption of 
the 1948 Belgrade Convention, maybe the first "conventional" act 
42 PCIJ, Advisory Opinion, 12 August 1922, Competence of the lLO, Se-
ries B, Nos. 2 and 3, p. 23. 
43 See L. Imbert, "Le régime juridique actuel du Danube", 55 RGDIP 
(1951), pp. 73-94· 
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of the Cold War to come.44 The western powers- UK, France, US 
- refused to sign the draft prepared by the Soviet representative, 
who otherwise was not too much sadden by this refusai. He was 
thus reported to have said to the western delegates: « The door 
was open for you to come in; the door is open for you to leave, if 
that is what you wish. »45 And that is what the Western Powers in 
fact did. 
Beyond these circumstantial, historical reasons, the decline 
of the river commissions is essentially due to the consolidation 
of State sovereignty during 2dh century. Indeed, the 19th century 
commissions were set out by States victorious in war, as a form 
of securing their interests beyond their terri tory. The membership 
in commissions reflected this essential purpose: riparian States 
- when they were represented- and non-riparian States were 
placed on an equal footing. No wonder that this model of 
international organization could not ~urvive to the principle of 
sovereign equality. Even the Rhine Çommission, a successful 
model otherwise, saw its means red~ced by the 1963 revision 
of the Mannheim Convention. However, in contrast to the 
Danube Commission, the Rhine Commission still has the power 
to take binding decisions. States' consent is being secured by 
the rule of unanimity, as well as by the possibility for one State 
to opt out of decisions with which it does not agree46• The 
material scope of the Rhine Commission's powers is also great 
compared with those of the Danube Commission. Moreover, 
the Rhine Commission enjoys jurisdictional powers (special, 
tribunals are vested with the power "to investigate and judge 
44 On the dissolution of the Commission and its replacement by a new 
Danube Commission in 1948, see H. Schermers and N. Blokker, Internation-
al Institutional Law, 5"' ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2011), pp. 1052-1053, 
§ 1635 and p. 1057, § 1642. 
45 J. Campbell, op. cit. note 71. 
46 See Article 46 of the Mannheim Convention. 
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ail infringements of regulations regarding navigation and river 
police"). 47 
The Danube is still in search for its madel: a new convention 
has been negotiated since 2005; its challenges and promises were 
discussed at length during the conference organized by the 
Romanian Society of International Law and the CEDIN in 2008, 
in the superb Palais de Béhague of the Romanian Embassy in 
Paris.48 But, not much has changed on that front; negotiations seem 
to have reached a stalemate, trapped by political inertia and 
unilateral actions of sorne Riparian States. There is also the 
European Union Strategy for the Danube Region, which has 
attracted much interest since 2008. As the website of the Romanian 
MFA makes known, this coordination program was initially 
conceived under the constraints of the "triple no": no new funds, 
no new institutions, no new regulations.49 Then, I can only conclude 
with a question: thus conceived, may the new strategy live up to 
the promises of Europe's second longest River? 
47 See Article 34 of the Mannheim Convention. 
48 The acts of the conference were published: B. Aurescu and A. Pellet 
(eds.), Actualité du droit des fleuves internationaux, Paris, Pedone, 2010, 308 
p. On the negotiations of the new convention, see 1. Diaconu, "Pour une 
nouvelle convention concernant la navigation sur le Danube", in ibid., pp. 
15}-160. 
49 http:/ /www.rnae.ro/strategia-dunarii. 
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